

App Security and Risk Findings - Finance -

Latin and South America

Executive Summary

The top banks and mobile payment providers in the Latin and South American regions may be accepting too much risk for security and privacy by failing to adhere to coding best practices, continuing to utilize excessive privileges, and sharing sensitive customer data with advertisers. According to our latest research of over 280 iOS and Android mobile banking and payment applications distributed in the Latin and South American regions, most failed the Open Web Application Security Project Mobile Top 10 and contain unnecessary risks and vulnerabilities.



Send query parameters containing PII over insecure communication channels.



Most apps 56% do not utilize any obfuscation or application shielding software to prevent reverse engineering.



Banks and payment app providers use excessive and unnecessary permissions on customers devices. This increases the risk of data leakage and privacy abuse.



Most finance mobile applications fail OWASP Mobile Top-10 checks for reverse engineering, secure storage, and secure communications.



Fraudulent mobile transactions have increased to an average of \$767 and make up 72% of fraudulent transactions.



Average value per fraudulent transaction





Bank Impersonations



These attacks leverage malicious mobile apps designed in such a way as to trick users into thinking they are from a legitimate financial institution.



Criminals seek to gain account credentials and/or credit card numbers. Once an account is breached, criminals can execute transfers or payments after logging into the account or can sell the credentials to another party.




Specially crafted apps for graphically imitating legitimate banking apps

Trojans running services and displaying overlays on top of legitimate banking apps mimicking legitimate banking applications











Nearly 3 of every 4 fraudulent transactions (72%) are via the mobile channel.




The average value of a fraudulent mobile payment transaction is \$767.



3,000+ Android Mobile Finance Apps







Lack of Obfuscation Leads to Reverse Engineering



Gain insight into critical processes

Exploit vulnerabilities

Extract sensitive information such as personal, financial information from the application's code



Uncover algorithms to replicate or abuse

Discover embedded credentials

Bypass security checks



Frida, Xposed, Substrate, QBDI, scriptable debuggers,
CaptainHook, MobileSubstrate,
Cycript, Cynject, IDA, Ghidra,
BinaryNinja, Hopper, Radare2,
JEB, jadx, apktool; dextra,
jtool, joker









Methodology



This research provides findings for security, data leakage, privacy abuse, and compliance for over 288 mobile banking and payment apps (114 iOS and 174 Android) distributed in the Latin and South American regions.

Findings result from testing each public mobile app using Zimperium's application analysis engine, <u>zScan</u>. zScan is an application reputation scanning service providing deep intelligence about app behavior, including content (the app code itself), intent (the app's behavior), context (the domains, certificates, shared code, network communications, and other data), and compliance.

The OWASP summary contains testing results performed on the applications against the OWASP Top 10 Mobile categories.

The security summary focuses on application risks. These risks include functionality and code use, application capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities.

The privacy information focuses on the application's access to private user data, unique device identifiers, SMS, communications, and data storage.



OWASP Mobile Top 10 Results

code.


Part of our research into the mobile banking applications includes providing a passing or failing mark for each of the <u>OWASP Mobile Top 10</u>. The tables below summarize passing and failing marks collectively for all the apps on each platform. Some highlights include:





OWASP Mobile Top 10








OWASP Mobile Top 10







Fail



Privacy and Security Risk Distribution








Critical Security Findings








Critical Security Findings








Dangerous Security Findings








Dangerous Security Findings








Critical Privacy / Leakage Findings








Critical Privacy / Leakage Findings








Dangerous Privacy / Leakage Findings








Dangerous Privacy / Leakage Findings








Privacy and Security Risk Distribution









Critical Security Findings



Uses WebKit to download a file from the Internet Uses method to blindly load all apps and JAR files Can retrieve remote apps, Java code and DEX files Vulnerable Facebook SDK version Does validate CN(Common Name) of the SSL certificate This app contains unsafe cryptographic encryption patterns Has the functionality to install additional apps App refers to SSL/TLS hosts with self-signed certificate SA This app accepts all security certificates Vulnerable to CVE-2015-8320 Bundling Additional Android applications Contains commands to Stop and Start a proxy server The application has been packed with Jiagu Packer Uses an SSL connection with disabled security checks This app can perform a Traceroute network function. 0% 10% 20% 30%



Critical Security Findings



APAC

EMEA

NA

SA


Uses WebKit to download a file from the Internet Uses insecure data storage mode Uses method to blindly load all apps and JAR files Can retrieve remote apps, Java code and DEX files Vulnerable Facebook SDK version Does validate CN(Common Name) of the SSL certificate This app contains unsafe cryptographic encryption patterns Has the functionality to install additional apps App refers to SSL/TLS hosts with self-signed certificate This app accepts all security certificates Vulnerable to CVE-2015-8320 Bundling Additional Android applications Contains commands to Stop and Start a proxy server The application has been packed with Jiagu Packer Uses an SSL connection with disabled security checks This app can perform a Traceroute network function. 0% 10% 20%



30%

Dangerous Security Findings







Dangerous Security Findings




Stores inline API keys/values Using 'proceed()' method during SSL error handling Uses insecure data storage mode This app can create and share an RSS Feed APAC App implements a custom keyboard extension EMEA NA API can publish/receive messages from nearby devices SA Gives PendingIntent to another application Additional app links discovered in communications App is accessing Google Drive 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%



Critical Privacy/Data Leakage Findings








Critical Privacy/Data Leakage Findings








Dangerous Privacy / Leakage Findings








Dangerous Privacy / Leakage Findings







Best Practices and Recommendations

- Scan and test for app vulnerabilities and risks in the build pipeline to reduce attack surface
- Shield and harden app to increase reverse engineering difficulty
- Defend from fraud by measuring vulnerabilities and realtime attacks to customers' devices



About the authors



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Scott has over 20 years experience providing customized software solutions to enterprise customers in mobile, supply chain and DevOps. Scott invests his time researching mobile app security and worldwide mobile threat events.

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Ken Lloyd is a highly accomplished Senior Global Tech Executive and Board Member with more than 20 years of success in cyber security sector focusing in on the areas of Anti-Malware/Virus technologies and Mobile Security product solutions.

